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General James L. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, while Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. General Jones is now retired and currently serving as President Obama's National Security Advisor.
One can only wonder what General (Retired) Jones would say in his current position about the number of lawyers required to fight a battle, much less actually win a war, when the simple issue of detaining our enemies has grown into such a complex and confusing exercise.
Perhaps the struggle of U.S. leaders to establish a clear policy for the detention of enemy supporters and fighters in this armed conflict is evidence of Clausewitz's observation that - [E] verything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.‖ 2 Throughout much of the history of warfare, those like today's terror suspects who took part in armed conflict without being part of the -uniformed army‖ were summarily killed when captured. 3 Now, the U.S. finds itself criticized both home and abroad for merely detaining these individuals under humane conditions. A Washington Post editorial calls on the government to craft -a sound legal structure to govern indefinite detentions.‖ 4 But such a legal structure is already in place and indefinite detention is, as will be explained more fully below, a myth.
The U. S. Government itself has contributed to this confusion. The May 2010 National Security Strategy was drafted in such a way that prosecution of suspected terrorist is our first option and, only if they can't be prosecuted, the U.S. we will turn to a system of prolonged detention in order to protect the American people. 5 U.S. officials openly discuss the recidivism rate of former detainees that have been released. This use of criminal law terminology to address what is really a law of war issue adds to the confusion as to whether we are arresting criminals or capturing enemies. 6 A discussion of recidivism would have been simply unimaginable in past conflicts. One has to wonder why U.S. national security officials would find any rate of recidivism acceptable.
One of the consequences of the U.S. failure to provide the courts and the public with a logical legal framework to explain who we are detaining and why, we find ourselves in a position where, from a legal standpoint, it is arguably easier for U.S. forces to kill our enemies than it is to detain them. This should be troubling to leaders and citizens alike. Release of enemies captured during armed conflict is not required by law or common sense until, in the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, -the fighting stops.‖ 7 Under international law, detention is viewed as a lesser form of coercion than even trial, much less death. Doesn't it then logically follow that it should be easier, or at least not more difficult, to detain someone than to kill them?
This paper suggests an approach to handling detainees that is not only lawful and reasonable; it is easily understandable by the average individual on the street. We should call suspected terrorist with connections to al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces what they areour enemies -and detain them under the law of war until the end of this conflict. If any of these detainees committed criminal misconduct prior to their capture, they can be prosecuted in federal court or military commissions, whichever forum is more appropriate under the circumstances. 8 
A Confusing Mixture
To date the United States has employed a confusing mixture of domestic criminal law and law of war when dealing with detainees. Little time and effort has been put forth in explaining why some detainees are referred to as -law of war‖ detainees while others are prosecuted under U.S. criminal statutes in federal courts. This absence of a logical explanation has added fuel to arguments such as the often repeated one that charging detainees with crimes in federal court is treating them as -common criminals.‖ This criticism is, in part, valid. They shouldn't be treated solely as common criminals. To do so would be using the wrong legal tool to address the real problem, which the Courts, Congress and the President all agree, is the ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces.
Why Detain? Enemy or Criminal?
When involved in armed conflict the reason you detain your enemies is to remove them from the fight until the fight is over. This is a time honored, universally recognized, lawful and logical basis to detain someone. You do not return your enemy to the fight. You are lawfully required to release your enemy only at the end of the conflict be that in ten days, ten months, ten years, or longer. The so called indefinite detention of those captured during the current conflict is no more indefinite that the detention of any combatant (lawful or unlawful) in any prior war.
Release from detention under the law of war has always been tied to an event, the end of the conflict, rather than to a date certain. In that sense, law of war detention is always, by definition,
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indefinite when compared to a specific sentence handed down by a criminal court after conviction of a criminal offense. Noriega provides an example of how these two bases for detention, criminal law and law of war, can apply to the same individual. There is no legal impediment to holding someone both as a prisoner during armed conflict and as a criminal suspect/sentenced prisoner after a criminal conviction. These are two separate, but not mutually exclusive, theories supporting detention. found that it is not -mutually exclusive‖ to be a prisoner of war and a criminal suspect/convicted felon, there should be no legal issue with being a law of war detainee in the current armed conflict and a criminal suspect at the same time. The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 , and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks. The president also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces. 27 In this fight, we have to understand that a single individual may well be an associated force. In fact that is a fitting way to think of these individuals that either through some sort of recruitment or self identification come to associate with al Qaeda to plan, attempt, or actually carry out various attacks. The September 11th attacks were carried out by 19 individuals, the London transit bombings were carried out by four individuals, the shoe bomber, Richard Reed, to serve the remainder of his military commission sentence was quoted as saying -Legally, we absolutely have a right to hold enemy combatants, but politically is he the guy we want to fight all the way to the Supreme Court about? I think we came to the conclusion that, no, he wasn't.‖ 30 However, actions like the return of Hamdan have not been sufficiently explained so that the public understands that the U.S was not legally required to take that course of action.
Confusion in U.S. Courts
The intervention of the courts has not brought clarity to this issue. If anything it has added another layer of uncertainty and further complicated the war effort of the United States.
Courts have become the driving force in an issue that is better suited for resolution by the political branches. Even the Supreme Court appears to acknowledge this. As noted earlier, the Court recognized in Boumediene that -judicial intervention might have complicated the military's ability to negotiate exchanges of prisoners with the enemy, a wartime practice well know to the Framers,‖ 31 in the context of a declared war between nations states. If anything, the courts invention in detainee cases has complicated this issue even more under the circumstances of the current non-international armed conflict than it would have if this was a war between nation states and thus, a more traditional international armed conflict. In everything from negotiating with other countries to resettle detainees, to trying to reach accommodation with some warring factions, the Executive Branch must now also be concerned about what the courts will do as it tries to resolve these issues. Our enemies are aware of the courts involvement.
Individual detainees may see the courts as a potential escape value and consequently be unwilling to entertain any approaches on reconciliation and cooperation by U.S. officials. Our enemies are able to monitor court proceedings and learn from them. for detention regardless of any prosecution would hopefully assist the courts as they address these issues.
The Battlefield
Defining the battlefield has proven difficult in this conflict. However that term ends up being defined, geographic location at time of capture should not be the determining factor in whether someone is found to be a criminal defendant or an enemy combatant. Under the AUMF as interpreted by the courts, the standard for detainability is whether someone is a member of, or substantially supported, al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force. 35 But some court opinions would lead one to believe that the caution from Eisentrager about -calling the field commander to account in his own civil courts‖ only applies if the enemy is captured and confined outside the U.S. 36 It appears the courts have failed to appreciate the international geographic reach of this armed conflict. There can be little doubt that our enemies take comfort, as the Eisentrager opinion warned, in the constant and very public arguing back and forth on how to handle our enemies when they are captured. It must appear to the rest of the world, and U.S. citizens for that matter, that our leaders do not understand our own legal system. Courts however continue to view the battlefield as being a specific geographic space in some far off land. Have they forgotten that the acts of war that began this armed conflict were attacks at the center of New York City and Washington, D.C.? 40 Attacks which were carried out by individuals dressed as civilians. This is our enemy. This is how they fight, and, as recent failed attacks have shown, how they will continue to fight. There will be no Taliban or al Qaeda invasion fleet that appears over the horizon ready to strike the U.S. homeland although that is the type of enemy Courts continue to envision. These terrorist fighters have been described as -criminals in combat.‖ 41 That is the way we should think of them, regardless of the place of capture. They are not true civilians. They are not common criminals. They are enemy fighters that can lawfully be detained under the laws of war. It should be remembered that those fighters captured within the United States are the al Qaeda and Taliban forces most likely to inflict real harm on the United States.
Designation of Enemies
One basic question one has to ask is which branch of government is best suited to determine who are enemies of the United States? The Judiciary which considers only evidence admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence? Or the Executive branch with its superior sources of intelligence and information? One of the basic tenants of the law of war is distinction. 42 In other words, we must distinguish between combatants and civilians and target only combatants. Thus, in order to target someone, commanders are lawfully required to determination that they are a combatant. Shouldn't this determination also be sufficient to -constitutional commitment to the courts for review of a military decision to launch a missile at a foreign target‖ 44 The court distinguished this decision from those on detainees and asset seizures where the courts have found a constitutional commitment to the judiciary. However legally well founded these positions may be, they leave U. S. leaders in the strange position of knowing that their decisions to target and kill someone cannot be challenged in the courts but courts will entertain challenges to their decisions to capture and detain someone. 45 A Suggested Approach
We can bring some clarity to this situation by a shift of focus in the approach put forth in the May 2010 National Security Strategy. The current practice of defaulting to a civilian criminal approach and then, only if it appears this course of action will not be successful, holding
the detainee into what is referred to as prolonged detention should be abandoned. It's not surprising that this approach raises fears of indefinite detention and confusion about these perpetrators being common criminals. The U.S. should adopt the exact opposite approach. That is, as soon as investigators identify a link between a suspect and -al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces,‖ that suspect should be treated as a law of war detainee. If they are our enemies, and the President, Congress, and the Courts all agree that individuals associated with these groups are, then they should receive the legal treatment that status earns them.
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In other words, law of war detention should be a starting point rather than a last resort for those terror suspects with connections to al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated groups. These individuals can be lawfully detained on that basis alone. There is no element of punishment in law of war detention. If investigation turns up sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing, then the detained individuals can be prosecuted for that as well. But there is no requirement for a rush to prosecution or for any prosecution at all.
Role of Civilian Authorities
Adopting this approach to first emphasize the Law of detention authority over any suspect connected to al Qaeda, the Taliban or an associated force does not drastically change the role of civilian authorities. It doesn't mean that civilian law enforcement cannot interrogate suspected terrorist. It doesn't mean suspected terrorist can't be held in civilian confinement facilities. It also doesn't mean that suspect terrorist will not end up facing prosecution in civilian courts. In appropriate cases, they should face civilian prosecution for their crimes. It must be remembered that we are talking about two separate bases for detention. As the case of General A great deal of discussion and political posturing has popped up on the issue of Miranda warnings for terror suspects. Whether Miranda is an issue or not depends upon which basis of confinement we are talking about. Miranda plays no part in law of war detention. We do not need to worry about evidence to use at trial in law of war detention because no trial is required.
Granted, the U.S. will have to defend against habeas petitions but detainee statements have been admitted in those proceedings without Miranda warnings. 48 Where Miranda becomes a concern is in criminal prosecution.
The Attorney General has raised the possibility of seeking legislation to expand the public safety exception to the Miranda Rule in National Security cases. Much like the indictment of Umar Farouk Abdulmuttallab, the criminal complaint against
Shahzad makes no mention of his connection to the Pakistani Taliban, although it does mention his admission that he received training in bomb making while in Pakistan. 52 At his initial court appearance on May 18, 2010, Shahzad did not oppose the government's request to continue his detention but his court appointed attorney did say that she may later seek Shahzad's release on bond. 53 The concept of -release on bond‖ does not exist in law of war detention and the fact that Shahzad's defense counsel believes her client can seek his release on bond is further evidence of how these cases are viewed as ordinary criminal matters. The United States would be better served by directly addressing the law of war basis for detention early on in cases of suspected terrorist with ties to al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. At the first opportunity the U.S.
should present the argument that these -criminals in combat‖ can be detained under the law of war for the duration of the armed conflict. This would remove the inference that can be drawn 22 from current practice that the U.S. resorts to this apparently weaker fallback position only when it does not possess sufficient evidence to proceed with a criminal prosecution.
Conclusion
Criminal investigators are the first authorities to encounter suspected terrorist, civilian confinement facilities are readily available, and prosecutors and judges are most comfortable dealing with criminal charges. Consequently an understandable default to criminal prosecution of suspected terrorist developed as it is a proven system, fully in place and easily accessible.
However understandable this approach may be, it should be recognized for what it is, a partial response to a multifaceted national security issue. Adopting this approach will not change our legal treatment of those terror suspects with no al Qaeda, Taliban, or associated force connection. Those suspects will continue to be treated solely as criminal suspects. That is the only lawful approach to handling those individuals unless Congress acts to expand the detention authority under the AUMF. Perhaps highlighting this limitation will spur Congress to further action should they question why some terror suspects are not being treated as a law of war detainees.
